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VINCENT GOOSSAERT
Diversity and elite religiosity in modern China
A model
This article looks at religious diversity among late imperial and modern Chinese elites; by contrast with most of the existing literature, which looks 
at correlations between social class and religiosity, 
this article adds the dimension of the exercise of per-
sonal choice and agency in the context of a vast and 
variegated religious repertoire. After reviewing existing 
theoretical models, it argues for the importance of two 
factors: a level of commitment to religious practices, 
in both the public and private realms, and knowledge 
(about the religion of others, whether one engages in 
such religion or not). It then charts these two factors on 
a graph onto which individuals can be placed, and thus 
grouped into types. These types represent a new and 
fruitful way of thinking about religious diversity.
The revolutionary reforms of 1898 launched 
modern China, in matters religious as well as in every 
other aspect of social and intellectual life (Goossaert 
2006). Even though these reforms were short-lived, 
the subsequent attempts at reforming the empire and 
then the Republican state policies were all inspired 
by the vision which had informed them. From this 
point on, a growing estrangement seems to have 
taken place between the elites and popular culture, in 
particular with regard to the latter’s religious aspects. 
This estrangement took very different forms, from 
an all-out westernization to a radical reinvention of 
Chinese identity that excluded whole realms of cul-
ture; it resulted in a violent propaganda campaign 
against ‘superstitions’ and repressive policies that 
caused the destruction of many temples, bans on 
festivals and rituals, and paved the way for the post-
1949 attempted eradication of most aspects of lived 
religion. 
Certain historians consider that these conflicts 
find their roots in earlier periods and the long-stand-
ing tension between elite Neo-Confucian culture and 
popular religion. Other historians, however, also note 
that, not unlike prerevolutionary societies in early 
modern Europe, the Qing (1644–1911) elites had 
also maintained a biculturality that allowed them to 
participate in both the culture (religious and other-
wise) proper to their milieu and to that of the society 
around them (Sutton 2000: 23–4). This biculturality 
extends to many realms, including language (local vs. 
Mandarin), food, performing arts, rituals and cults. 
The ruptures of modernity would then have been 
accompanied by a decline of such biculturality, and 
resulted, among the elites, in a complete misunder-
standing of, and deep aversion to, the religious prac-
tices and worldviews of the lower classes – a mis-
understanding and aversion which is still in evidence 
today, albeit obviously highly dependent on variables 
such as personal life histories and place of residence.
At the same time, estrangement from popular cul-
ture does not mean an overall decline in religiosity 
among modern elites: far from it. Republican (1912–
49) elites sustained a high level of religious com-
mitment that should be analysed in terms of both 
certain continuities with the late imperial period, and 
multifar ious forms of reinvention and innovation 
(Katz and Goossaert 2015). My purpose here is to 
explore ways of thinking about the personal religious 
worlds of the elites, and not their public activities or 
their philosophical pronouncements. I propose to 
build a model for producing an analysis of late impe-
rial elite religiosity that could be further used for tra-
cing developments in the post-1898 period and also 
to develop comparisons with other cultural spheres 
(these not being the objects of the present article).
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This, I propose, is a useful way to look anew at 
religious diversity in the Chinese context. Most of 
the attention, when the issue of diversity is raised 
(Schmidt-Leukel and Gentz 2013) has been focused 
on institutional plurality, with the framework of 
the ‘three teachings’ – Daoism, Confucianism, 
Buddhism – as a triple orthodoxy and its connections 
to sectarian traditions and popular/local/vernacular/
common religion. Much debate has already taken 
place on the relation of the clerical, institutional 
traditions of the three teachings and the rest of the 
religious field, and the category of ‘popular religion’ 
(Clart 2007). Geographical variation has also become 
a focus of research of late, giving space to a consider-
ation of social strata as well as an ethnic dimension 
in the debate on cultural and religious homogeneity 
(or the mere semblance thereof) in late imperial and 
modern Chinese culture (Sutton 2007). 
The approach adopted here, while also sensitive 
to correlations between social class and religiosity, 
adds the dimension of personal choice and agency in 
negotiating a vast and variegated religious repertoire. 
This does not mean I am adopting rational choice 
theory (the chief advocate of which in the Chinese 
context is Yang Fenggang, see Yang 2012). While this 
theory’s relevance to the situation in contempor ary 
China is debated (Palmer 2011), it is certainly largely 
irrelevant for earlier periods. For certain particular 
religious practices, there existed a market and people 
made individual choices (Goossaert 2011a); most reli-
gious choices, however, were collective. Furthermore, 
access to religious goods and services was heavily 
regulated, including for elites, not so much by the 
state but by local communities (Goossaert 2013). 
For these reasons, I insist on distinguishing between 
diversity and choice of religious affiliation as two 
distinct theoretical issues. Rather, I see diversity in 
modes of religious coexistence between different 
traditions, but even more between different styles, 
sensibilities and levels of commitment. While elites’ 
religious lives differed in style from those of non-
elites, the question of diversity is largely that of their 
articulation with other styles.
Late imperial elites
To explore the above issues requires a better under-
standing of the religious practices and attitudes of 
the elites and their connection to those of the society 
around them before 1898. Were elites in the last years 
of the Qing already alienated from the religion of the 
people, so that they only waited for a favourable polit-
ical context in order to participate in its repression? 
Or were they, to the contrary, maintaining connec-
tions, not necessarily warm, but nonetheless close, 
natural and regular ones, with the temples , cults and 
rituals around them? To what extent were the various 
types of elites (such as urban upper elites vs. rural-
based local gentry) factors in such differences? How 
did the post-1898 new polit ical and social conditions 
affect such connections, at the level of both social and 
private lives? 
Such questions raise numerous methodologic al 
issues. First, the term ‘elites’ suggests a certain cul-
tural homogeneity that on closer examination proves 
rather elusive. Internal differences are quite notable 
between upper elites (the jinshi 進士, i.e. laureates of 
the highest level of civil service examinations, almost 
all of them officials, active or retired), who adhered 
quite closely to Confucian norms and practices, and 
the middle and lower gentry (who had passed the 
first or second level but usually did not gain access 
to officialdom), whose religious identities were more 
varied. Together they formed the shenshi 紳士 (usu-
ally translated as gentry), a legal category privileged by 
the imperial state. These various strata of elite society 
were less differentiated according to education than 
social role, active officials having to enforce imperial 
laws, which were quite repressive in religious matters 
– even though in practice tolerance and negotiation 
were the domin ant mode of relationship between 
state agents and local religious groups (Goossaert 
2014a). Members of the gentry not being employed 
by the state were much freer to interpret and enact 
their role as educators of the people (jiaohua 教化). 
Among the latter, one finds local notables who played 
leadership roles within local religious structures, but 
also activists (people who by personal choice devoted 
themselves to a moral/religious cause, and invested 
a large proportion of their resources into it) trying 
to reform local religious practices. Some of the activ-
ists were fundamentalists, that is, people who dreamt 
of returning to the fantasied golden age described by 
the classic texts and wanted to abolish all later ritual, 
practical and theological accretions not warranted 
by them. Others (even though distinctions were 
never so clear-cut) had a more inclusive approach, 
often tied in to the practice of spirit-writing (fuji 
扶乩, feiluan 飛鸞, direct written revelations from the 
gods), the writing and diffusion of morality books, 
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and philanthropy. 
Furthermore, economic elites were closely allied 
to the gentry but might, as such, have had their own 
distinct religious activities; the leaders of the major 
guilds, who largely controlled civic life in the cities, 
organized the great festivals and processions (saihui 
賽會) that irked the officials and fundamentalist 
activists. To further complicate the picture, the upper 
strata of the Daoist and Buddhist clergies were full of 
members of the local elites, engaging in the same cul-
tural pursuits (painting, calligraphy, poetry) and co-
enforcing local regulations. To put it in a nutshell, late 
imperial elites had about as much religious plural ity 
as society as a whole.
The historiography so far has largely focused 
on state policies towards religion and their impact, 
rather than the convictions and worldviews that 
informed such policies and the pronouncements of 
the officials. Various theoretical and methodologic al 
tools have been applied, or at least proposed, in per-
forming such a task. Among such tools, formal reli-
gious affiliations are not really relevant here, as elites 
were defined ex officio as ‘Confucian’ (ru 儒) while 
they also followed the state in recognizing (to various 
extents) the validity of Buddhist and Daoist teach-
ings. Similarly, ‘faith’ or ‘belief ’ are hardly useful 
as a category, as sources rarely addressed religious 
involvements in such terms. The notion of piety is 
more useful; it allows us to focus our attention on the 
sensibility, style and aesthetics and the concrete ways 
in which one engages in or with religion, includ-
ing in informal settings. The aesthetic dimension is 
crucial in this concept, and sheds light on how elites 
self-identified with practices (meditation, moral self-
improvement, highly scripted liturgy, etc.) charac-
terized by self-control, solemnity, and restraint, in 
explicit contrast to what was described as the exuber-
ant style (excess of colours, sounds, expenses, etc.) of 
‘popular’ practices. 
Another, related concept, ‘modalities’, also use-
fully cuts across confessional religious identities 
(Confucian, Buddhist, Daoist, etc.); Adam Y. Chau 
distinguishes between five modalities of doing reli-
gion within Chinese (and other) societies: discursive 
(text-based); relational/organizational (organizing 
festivals, running temples), personal (self-cultivation, 
body techniques), liturgical, and immediate/practical 
(Chau 2011). The practices of modern Chinese elites 
certainly resort to several of these modalities: some 
elites devoted themselves to a discursive, exegetic al 
mode, as they read and commented upon large num-
bers of religious texts while declining as much as pos-
sible to take part in public religious activities, while 
others favoured the organizational modality, through 
moral activism (distributing morality books, public 
teaching and preaching, charitable activities and so 
on).
Useful as they are, the two concepts of piety and 
modality mostly allow us to apprehend the concep-
tions and practices of the most religiously-involved 
elites: the activists. Yet, in China as elsewhere, the 
degree of interest and involvement in things religious 
was highly variable: some people had a sustained 
personal practice and were active in religious organ-
izations, while others had a limited interest in such 
things, participating when they had to, with little 
personal commitment. A third concept, religious 
knowledge,1 is necessary at this point of our theor-
etical construct in order to bring into the analysis the 
large numbers of elites who had little visible religious 
involvement. By religious knowledge I mean what 
actors knew and understood about religion, and the 
vocabulary they used to discuss it, which includes 
conceptions and practices that are not those of the 
actors themselves, but that they see and understand 
(or not) among the people around them. Focusing on 
religious knowledge allows us to also ask the ques-
tion of what elites ignored or misunderstood, what 
were the limits to their capacity to understand and 
participate in the society around them, and to probe 
the issue of the modern distance between popular 
and official culture and religion.
I propose for our present purpose to define religi-
osity as the sum of the three concepts briefly outlined 
above – religious knowledge, piety, and the modality 
of religious enactment: that is to say, what individu-
als knew, felt and did. Defined thus, the notion opens 
windows on differences between various members of 
the elites – differences that are linked to context (his-
torical, local, familial) but also to individual choices 
and preferences. 
Public and private religiosities
Understanding any person’s religiosity involves dis-
tinguishing between different spheres, spanning 
the spectrum from official to public, to familial , 
1 In an earlier publication in French (Goossaert 2011b), 
I used the term ‘culture religieuse’. 
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to intimate. One must be careful when discuss-
ing public and private in the late imperial context, 
when they were defined in ways markedly different 
from what we know from contemporary experience. 
Furthermore, late imperial culture was imbued with 
a strong, age-old conviction that one’s public actions 
reflected the quality of one’s private moral cultiva-
tion. Yet a number of practices were compartmented: 
an official could engage at ease in Buddhist or Daoist 
self-cultivation, as long as he did not discuss it in his 
capacity as an official.
Religiosity in public life was largely defined by 
mandatory practices and observances, imposed 
either by law, custom or etiquette. Late imperial sit-
ting officials had to attend a very high number of 
sacrifices all year long, and were also obliged to visit 
fixed lists of temples on a regular basis; for instance, 
they went to the City God Temple, Chenghuangmiao 
城隍廟, twice a month. Students also had to partici-
pate twice a month in rituals in the Confucius temple. 
Besides this, officials and many other members of the 
elites were invited to all major local festivals, and 
could hardly systematically decline. They also had to 
attend family and lineage rituals of their kin and their 
social network. Very often, they were invited to take 
an active role in such celebrations, being for instance 
invited to perform the consecration of the soul-tablet 
of a deceased. More generally, literati who had passed 
the first degree of the examinations, and were thus 
part of the gentry, were qualified to act as performer 
of Confucian rituals, lisheng 禮生. Some poor schol-
ars, or from families specialized in Confucian ritual, 
made a living from their liturgical expertise; many 
more engaged it on a more occasional basis (Liu Y. 
2013).
Browsing through the diaries of late Qing schol-
ars, one realizes the pervasiveness of this social 
religious life. Arguably in many, if not most, cases 
partici pating in such rituals was routine, and did not 
imply a deep emotional or spiritual involvement on 
the part of the participants, who would be waiting 
for the end of the ritual for an opportunity to chat 
with their kin, friends or colleagues around the ban-
queting table. Yet, one cannot deny that these rituals 
could induce meaningful religious experiences, and 
that they informed, possibly passively and uncon-
sciously, the habitus and worldviews of those who 
had to attend them so often. At the very least, they 
nourished the literati’s liturgical culture.
Another type of participation in local religious 
life concerns the role of elites in community religious 
institutions, notably the management of the large 
temples. Historians tend to assume that elites grad-
ually retreated from this role at the end of the imper-
ial period, but no study yet documents in detail the 
chronology, causes and scope of this phenomenon.2 
Merchants remained deeply involved in the manage-
ment of urban temples into the first decades of the 
twentieth century, showing a case of partial continu-
ity across the revolutions. Even when not active in the 
management of the temples, members of the elites 
continued to be called on to write inscriptions for 
temples and monasteries (literary patronage), which 
requires some knowledge of the cults and traditions 
involved; similarly, many literati were involved in the 
compilation of local gazetteers and other essays in 
local history, which necessarily dealt with local cults 
and ritual culture. Furthermore, elite activists were 
managing their own charities, shantang 善堂 and 
religious associations, which organized Confucian, 
Daoist and Buddhist rituals.
Beside this social religious life, the literati had, 
to a highly variable degree, a private religious life, 
chosen and characterized by more intense spiritual 
involvement. Some of them were lay Buddhists. 
Perhaps the best known in the existing scholarly lit-
erature is Peng Shaosheng 彭紹升 (1740–96), a jinshi 
and a member of the extremely prestigious Suzhou 
Peng lineage, who has left a legacy of many influ-
ential works in both the classics and Buddhism.3 
Others chose to immerse themselves in Daoist self-
cultivation techniques, notably inner alchemy, taking 
an active part in the writing, editing and distribution 
of manuals, and teaching to a few selected disciples 
(Goossaert 2007: 283–97). Such Daoist self-cultiva-
tors were by no means recluses: consider the case of 
the famous Daoist-cum-businessman-cum-reformist 
2 Susan Naquin (2000), David Faure (2007) and 
Michael Szonyi (2002 ) have all documented how 
local elites have massively invested in certain institu-
tions (lineages, charities) in late imperial times, often, 
but not always, to the detriment of local temples. 
There are however counter-examples where local 
elites did reinforce their involvement in community 
temples during the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries (Katz 2003). On the case of the City 
God temples, especially in the context of the post-
Taiping reconstruction of communal institutions, see 
Goossaert 2015a.
3 On the religious culture of the prestigious Suzhou 
Peng family, see Burton-Rose 2016.
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intellectual Zheng Guanying 鄭觀應 (1842–1921).4 
Buddhist meditation and Daoist inner alchemy were 
part of a larger set of spiritual techniques that come 
up (usually only in a very allusive manner) in the 
writings of the literati, whereby they controlled their 
minds and bodies, dealt with dangers and the pres-
ence of spirits, and with illnesses by means of recita-
tion of incantations (zhou 咒), visualizations, divin-
ation, devotional rites, penance, meditation (jingzuo 
靜坐), and so forth.
One of the most widespread and influential of 
such techniques was the practice of spirit-writing 
which lay at the core of the religious lives of late 
imperial elites, in both private (homes) and public 
(temples) settings.5 Morality books (shanshu 善書) 
revealed by spirit-writing constitute the largest part 
of the production of religious texts by elites since 
around the sixteenth century; these books carried a 
vision of educational, charitable and moral reform, 
but also had a strong devotional dimension concern-
ing saviour deities, notably Wenchang, Guandi 關帝 
and Lü Dongbin 呂洞賓 (Goossaert 2015b). Some of 
these productions defined religious practices explic-
itly linked to the literati, such as the cult of written 
characters, xizi 惜字. 
Indeed, far from exposing a ‘secular’ ethics, 
the omnipresent spirit-writing cults and attend-
ant moral reform movements were developing a 
vibrant eschat ology, whereby literati were entrusted 
with saving the world from impending apocalypse 
(Goossaert 2014b). When the apocalypse did seem 
to have arrived, in the form of the unprecedented 
massacres and chaos of the Taiping war (1851–64), 
it is with these tools that many literati made sense 
of the events, and they resorted even more ener-
getically to spirit-writing and moral proselytizing 
(Goossaert 2016). Movements of religious and cul-
tural revital ization which emerged then were to con-
tinue into the twentieth century; they constituted a 
major case of continuity between the late imperial 
and the Republican elite religious worldviews (Yau 
2005; Wang C. 2015). Linked to these eschatological 
scenarios was a deeply-held aspiration to self-divin-
ization (Goossaert 2017). Late imperial elites, quite 
4 On Zheng Guanying’s involvement with Daoist self-
cultivation and spirit-writing, see Fan C. 2010; Liu X. 
2009: 22–3.
5 On modern spirit-writing groups, see Katz 2015a;  
Fan C. 2015.
independently of being transformed into ancestors 
by their kin, aspired to become gods as members of 
the divine bureaucracy, and had great confidence that 
they would be nominated as a City God or other such 
position (Clart 2003, Jordan and Overmyer 1986). 
Studies of the activist milieus such as those who 
ran spirit-writing cults and published their rev-
elations is obviously crucial for our understand-
ing of the religious world of late imperial elites, but 
it should not finesse the question of the rest of the 
elites. What proportion of the elites were partici-
pating in spirit-writing séances, and were actively 
involved in the other activities of the shantang? What 
proportion read the spirit-written revelations and 
morality books? We know of the activists by their 
publications (including spirit-written texts and their 
paratexts: prefaces, notes and appended records), but 
other elite members also left traces of their individual 
religious worlds in their private writings. In an inno-
vative work, Liu Xun studied the artistic and poetic 
productions of the literati in an aristocratic Manchu 
family, the Wanyan 完顏, that provided the Qing state 
with officials for each generation until the late nine-
teenth century; Liu demonstrated the importance for 
these literati-officials of a Daoist vision of the world, 
expressed in poems, that helped them make sense of 
the vicissitudes of their careers, and found an outlet 
in the worship of the immortal Lü Dongbin (Liu X. 
2004). Another major textual resource, already men-
tioned above, is that of diaries and autobiographies. 
Henrietta Harrison, whose study of the diary of 
Liu Dapeng 劉大鹏 (1857–1942), a poor provincial 
laureate (juren) from Shanxi, is particularly enlight-
ening: this scholar, as he represents himself in his 
daily notes, sees the moral retribution of actions at 
work at every turn of events, and is certain every 
time he encounters a setback that Heaven is punish-
ing him for his sins. This man, considered by the local 
population as an exemplary Confucian, is highly 
pious, regularly visits the local temples, and meets 
Confucius in a dream (Harrison 2005). This shows 
to what extent literati training and religious habitus 
were closely interwoven.
Writing about religion
Whereas personal texts such as poetry and diaries 
express an intimate religious world, chosen and not 
confrontational, other genres by contrast allow the 
literati to pass judgment on the religious culture of 
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others. The Chinese press, as it appears in the 1870s, 
played an active role in carrying such judgments, 
notably the best known of the daily newspapers, 
the Shenbao, published in the Shanghai concessions 
from 1872 until 1949. One finds in the Shenbao a 
very large number of reports describing local reli-
gious life in Shanghai and other major cities (includ-
ing spirit-writing activities), and anecdotes on the 
extraordinary (healings, exorcisms, miracles, strange 
apparitions), but also a highly developed polemical 
discourse, often anticlerical and occasionally hos-
tile towards the large community rituals (Goossaert 
2002a, 2002b). Such polemics are important not only 
as they prefigure elite attacks on popular religion as 
they unfolded from 1898 onward, but also as they 
express various levels of understanding of, and famil-
iarity with, the religious ideas and practices under 
attack.
One more genre opening a window on the reli-
gious worlds of late imperial elites is the anecdotes 
(biji 筆記) and notably those devoted to the ‘records 
of the strange’ (zhiguai 志怪). In a separate publi-
cation, I have developed a case study of one very 
promin ent late Qing intellectual, Yu Yue 俞樾 (1821–
1906), to explore his religious knowledge, based on 
his large collection of anecdotes, the Youtai xianguan 
biji 右台仙館筆記 (Goossaert 2011b). Yu is inter-
esting because he is not an activist, and he himself 
states quite clearly that his private religious life was 
less intense than that of many of his peers, friends 
and relatives. He did author two commentaries on 
religious classics (one Buddhist, one Daoist), but 
these are minor items in his overabundant oeuvre. 
However in the Youtai xianguan biji Yu documents 
his sustained interest in local religious culture, which 
he knows to an important extent through his female 
relatives (mother, wives, daughters, daughters-in-
law, servants) who themselves are active participants 
in local religious life. Yu could be critical of vernacu-
lar rites and specialists but not systematically, as he 
also has a nuanced discourse on spirit-mediums. He 
readily admits that the world he lives in is saturated 
with ghosts and spirits, but thinks upright scholars 
are superior to them because ‘a righteous person 
cannot be overcome by wickedness’. Yu is interested 
in the multifarious spiritual techniques used by his 
friends and students; he does not himself engage in 
spirit-writing, but many people around him do. Like 
so many other authors, Yu dismisses some cases as 
frauds, but not on principle. Last but not least, Yu 
accepts as a matter of fact that scholars become gods; 
most of his deceased kin and friends have acknowl-
edged postings in the other world.
Due to his being anchored in a rural, domestic 
universe and territory, Yu has some familiarity, even 
though it is not always sympathetic, with the religious 
world of the common people; he thus considers that 
the religion that unfolds around him is comprehen-
sible. As a member of the elite, he takes very ser iously 
his role as a moral authority, but he mostly writes as 
a benevolent observer rather than a fiery reformer of 
‘popular’ practices. One generation later, many schol-
ars will describe the same world of popu lar cults, rites 
and specialists as altogether absurd and alien. Yet, we 
should not overstate rupture over continuity: Yu does 
not participate in local religious life beyond domestic 
activities. He apparently hardly ever goes to temples 
and festivals. He does not chronicle these cults and 
festivals as folklorists do, and it does not seem to him 
a particularly important aspect of culture worth pre-
serving. Yu thus appears as a link between classic al 
culture and the early twentieth-century redemp-
tive societies that will reformulate and revitalize the 
Chinese spiritual heritage, and in which several of 
Yu’s students will be active (Goossaert and Palmer 
2011: chapter 4). His religious vision is in line with 
the ‘popular Confucianism’ described by Philip Clart 
(2003), which was based on a social stratum of edu-
cated people aspiring to become gods, and to bringing 
back moral order to the world. Yu shares with them 
a conception of holiness based on self-discipline and 
moral self-cultivation, and their steadfast conviction 
of the spiritual superiority of the scholars.
A model of elite religiosity 
Based on the above considerations, I would like to 
propose a simple model of Chinese religiosity, valid 
across time, that would chart members of the elites 
according to two key parameters than seem most 
heur istically important: commitment and knowledge.
Commitment means the degree to which a given 
individual devotes an important part of her time, 
energy and resources (both material and symbolic) 
to religious activities and endeavours; as discussed 
above, high levels of commitment can be invested in 
either the public or the private realm, or both. It has 
been remarked repeatedly that in pre-1911 China (and 
even after that) any distinction between religious and 
non-religious institutions and activities is very moot. 
16 Approaching Religion • Vol. 7, No. 1 • April 2017 
Still, humans have by character and training widely 
varying appetites for rituals, cults and other religious 
activities, and among modern Chinese elites, there is 
a clear gradient between people who seem to have, or 
indeed admit to having, little patience for perform-
ing sacrifices, listening to sermons, and meditating, 
and those who confess and profess a strong attraction 
to such activities. Keeping in mind that commitment 
varies according to the modalities (intense medita-
tors can eschew participation in temple manage-
ment), I give a high mark to those individuals who 
devote time and money to such activities as setting 
up associations or temples, organizing rituals, writ-
ing, editing, and publishing religious books.
The second parameter is knowledge of religious 
culture, which I have defined above as an interest 
in things religious and an expressed understanding 
of one’s religious context, whether the individual in 
question participates in it or not.
If we set these two parameters as the axes of a 
chart, and start to place individuals accordingly (this 
is, admittedly, a subjective exercise), then patterns 
and clusters begin to appear, which we can theorize 
as ideal types. It bears pointing out that the two axes 
are independent – which sets my chart apart from 
Bourdieu’s chart of the religious field, where the 
axes of capital and power are interdependent. One of 
the benefits of such an exercise is that it allows for 
the clustering of people who may have lived differ-
ent lives, and have practised rather different types of 
religion, but who nonetheless exhibit rather similar 
attitudes towards the religious. 
Let us look at clusters that form in the four quad-
rants of our chart – remembering that most people 
tended to congregate somewhere in the middle, as in 
any such chart. Top left are people with a high level 
of commitment, but a low level of knowledge; I call 
them ‘fundamentalists’: people intensively engaged 
with their own particular tradition, but willfully 
ignorant, and usually rather dismissive, of other trad-
itions and forms of religious practice. 
Top right are people both engaged and cultured: 
I deem them ‘activists’, as many activists tend to have 
broad interests and to participate in groups (such as 
spirit-writing cults) that cover a large spectrum of 
religious convictions. It is important to emphasize 
COMMITMENT
KNOWLEDGE
ALOOFNESS
IGNORANCE
Ethnographers
Fundamentalists Activists
Sceptics
Chen Hongmou Zheng Guanying Liu Dapeng
Peng Shaosheng
Yu Zhi
Yu Yue
Fig. 1. Types of elite religiosity; charting selected late Qing individuals.
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how much agency elites had in fashioning engaged 
religious lives, thus creating a highly diverse social 
landscape; the choice between engaging or not engag-
ing, but also between innumerable and very different 
religious groups (for example, clergy-led or anti-
clerical, pietistic or socially engaged, conservative or 
eschatological) vying for their commitment. Consider 
for instance Yu Zhi 余治 (1809–74), an extremely 
engaged Jiangnan scholar who wrote, printed and 
disseminated religious tracts in many genres (thea-
tre, vernacular ballads, tracts in classical Chinese), 
and was famous for his charitable activities. During 
the Taiping war, Yu Zhi lived as a refugee collecting 
funds for the loyalist armies and militia, organizing 
anti-Taiping propaganda, and relentlessly preaching 
in public, exhorting people to repent and engage in 
moral reform so that the gods may be appeased and 
peace return to China (Meyer-Fong 2013: chapter 
2). Peng Shaosheng, mentioned above, is another 
good example, being both a devoted Buddhist, and 
an active participant in spirit-writing cults (which the 
Buddhist clerics tended to disapprove of).
Bottom right are people interested in and knowl-
edgeable about religion, but with a low level of per-
sonal participation. I call them ‘ethnographers’, and I 
take Yu Yue as a good example. Yu Yue wrote about 
beliefs, local gods, and rituals at length, yet told us 
that he himself did not believe or personally engage 
much in these things.
Finally, bottom left are people both ignorant 
and aloof from religion: the sceptics. This is likely 
the category that underwent the greatest growth as 
Chinese society moved from the late imperial to the 
Republican period.
Conclusion: changes among the Republican elites
While I explore twentieth-century changes in 
elite religiosity in another publication (Katz and 
Goossaert forthcoming), I would like to make some 
tentative suggestions here as to how the chart can be 
used to see changes as gradual and multi-factored 
rather than revolutionary. Admittedly, the social 
and politic al dynamics that created the elite classes 
changed dramatically as the imperial regime gave 
way to the Republic. Think for instance of the first 
Chinese parliament, elected (indirectly, through 
assemblies of local elites) between December 1912 
and January 1913: 60 out of 274 members were 
Christians (who were still outlaws just two gener-
ations earlier) (Goossaert and Palmer 2011: 70). 
With the end of the civil service examinations in 
1905, the criteria for official recruitment changed, 
to favour modern schools, both civil (many of which 
were Christian-run) and military. 
Besides education, urbanization, and its corollary, 
the gradual dismantling of the rurally based landlord 
elite families was also a key factor in the process of 
change in elite religiosity. It is no coincidence that 
early Republican-period anti-superstition activ-
ists were often people who had cut away from their 
extended family and country home, and were advo-
cating the ‘small family’. Ideas of public and private 
lives also evolved as a consequence. Why this matters 
is amply demonstrated by the case study of Yu Yue 
evoked above. Back in the 1890s, Yu could claim 
both to be a sophisticated literati, removed from an 
uncough peasantry, sitting in his studio on an island 
on the West Lake in Hangzhou – the very Mecca of 
literati refinement – and at the same time to be very 
well informed indeed about what the spirit-mediums 
were doing in the villages through his discussions 
with his servants, daughters-in-law, poorer kin and 
other relatives who were going there. Similar cases 
become much harder to find from the 1920s onwards. 
Another major correlate of the social develop-
ments spurred on by education and urbanization 
is the increased participation of women in mixed-
gender religious activities, such as spirit-writing, 
publishing and lecturing. Late imperial elite women 
had a large range of religious practices at their dis-
posal, including devotional and self-cultivational 
practices at home, and some became religious vir-
tuosi teaching their male kin (Liu X. 2015), but their 
participation in collective religious activities outside 
the family sphere was always contentious (Goossaert 
2008). By the Republican period, the discourse on 
the ‘new woman’ was on the one hand claiming to 
liberate women from the shackles of superstition, but 
on the other actually giving them more freedom to 
participate in spirit-writing groups (where they often 
became very numerous), study groups, mixed-gen-
der sutra recitation groups and other types of public 
religious organization.6 
6 For a masterful discussion of modern religious 
change from a gendered perspective, see Kang 2015. 
Some spirit-writing groups maintained gender seg-
regation during the Republican period, to show their 
higher ‘moral’ standards, but this practice became 
ever more marginal. 
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As a result of these various, mutually reinforcing 
factors, we see developments unfolding that we can 
trace on our chart. To sum up our most basic find-
ings, many members of the Republican elites seem 
rather to lose knowledge of religious culture than to 
disengage: they move leftward rather than downward 
in our chart. This, I hasten to add, is a very general 
trend than tells us nothing about individuals. And 
all four ideal types are still to be found throughout 
the twentieth century. There were countless religious 
activists in Republican China: consider such people 
as Wang Yiting 王一亭 (1867–1938), a prominent 
businessman who canvassed for support, organized 
and funded countless religious organizations, rit u-
als and projects, from the most orthodox monastic 
Buddhism to a wide assortment of spirit-writing cults 
and redemptive societies (Katz 2014). Wang and his 
many friends carried forth the spirit of the engaged 
layperson. Educated non-committed people were 
also around. Those local intellectuals in Wenzhou 
who, well into the early Communist period, wrote 
down the local customs and found ways around the 
strictures of atheist orthodoxy to paint them in the 
best possible light, are fine exemplars of this type 
(Katz 2015b).
But there is no doubt that the ranks of both 
fundamentalists and sceptics grew over the fifty 
years, and beyond into the contemporary era. Many 
Christians, who wanted to rid China of its supersti-
tions, swelled the ranks of its fundamentalists; so did 
adepts of a reformed Buddhism. We find representa-
tives of both categories among the nationalist polit-
icians and activists who devised and implemented 
the anti-superstition policies. Indeed, many elites 
who rejected traditional Chinese religious culture 
were not atheists but Christians. Just like Christians, 
the more numerous elite lay Buddhists also tended 
to maintain a high level of commitment to their own 
cultivation while showing a lesser degree of knowl-
edge of ‘popular’ and local religion. 
This raises the last, but not least element of con-
temporary change in elite religiosity: a trend, cer-
tainly not unique to China, towards confessionaliza-
tion. People who engage with religion tend more and 
more to identify with one religion (notably, but not 
exclusively, Buddhism and Christianity) and to adopt 
practices and lifestyles proper to that religion. This is 
both a global phenomenon and a mostly unintended 
effect of the religious policies pursued in the Chinese 
world since the early twentieth century. Such a trend 
does not adversely affect overall religiosity, but it does 
limit personal agency in knowing about and engag-
ing in other practices, and thus building diversity at 
the individual level. 
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